Should Western-Based Ethics Theories
Form the Foundation of
Global Distance Education?

Vanessa Paradis
March 14, 2008

Why should I be good?

If the answer to that is unknown,
All discussion is meaningless.

Kreyche, 2007

Abstract

There is no single ethics theory that works in isolation to solve dilemmas resulting from the use of technology, but rather several theories are used in a patchwork fashion to make ethical decisions. As a result, a patchwork approach is used to answer the question, What should we do? Complex ethical decisions are made out of tradition, using ethics committees comprised primarily of men who often fail to consider the views of those affected by the decisions being made for them. Introduced biases and ethnocentricities sometimes result in unfair and immoral decisions. Applying this process globally for education in the multicultural Internet environment could result in unresolved disagreements over the use of technology. Alternatively, adopting an ecological philosophical worldview to solve ethical dilemmas would lead to more in-depth answers to the question, Why should we do it? and allow a new, holistic theory of ethics to emerge. Applying this philosophy to global distance education programs provides greater promise than relying on traditional ethics theories and decision-making processes.

Should Western-Based Ethics Theories
Form the Foundation of
Global Distance Education?

	Distance education is rapidly expanding globally, and it is necessary to evaluate how well computer ethics can resolve issues and disagreements over using technology, particularly controversies arising from cultural differences. Due to an historical tradition of ethnocentrism, western-based ethics theories are not likely to work well in a global community in which people have multiple and diverse views. The theories are incomplete and require a patchwork approach in order to apply them in any meaningful sense. This may result in resistance and possibly feelings of animosity from people of other societies. Resolving ethics issues requires a holistic, non-anthropocentric exploration of possible solutions and requires answering, “Why should I be good?” (Kreyche, 2007, para. 3). According to Kreyche, (2007), “If the answer to that is unknown, all discussion is meaningless” (para. 3). A holistic theory of computer ethics that incorporates other worldviews is necessary if the U.S. is to venture successfully into the global distance education market.
The move of U.S. ethics theories away from an anthropocentric (human-centered) worldview by using Environmental Ethics is a step toward a holistic theory because the moral responsibility toward the environment is incorporated, and theoretically, active involvement of all affected stakeholders, as well (Brennan, 2008; Eccleston, 2000). However, there is still often a failure “to view planning from a holistic standpoint,” and stakeholder views are excluded from the final actions (Eccleston, 2000, p. 4). Deep Ecology, an emerging philosophical theory, shows promise for providing a more holistic exploration and the integration of diverse views, because it requires comprehensively asking, Why? (Harding, 1998). This philosophy goes a step beyond environmental ethics; it requires committed action directed toward environmental sustainability, social justice, and peace (Harding, 1998). Thus, using this process to guide distance education programs creates a greater chance for success, because rather than ethics committees, group consensus informs actions and policies. Ultimately, a new computer ethics theory can emerge to serve multicultural global learning programs more succescfuly than existing computer ethics dominated by European worldviews.
The State of Computer Ethics
Computer ethics, referred to as “cyberethics” by Spinello and Tavani (2004, p. 1), is defined as the field of applied ethics relating to the ethical use of technology. Currently based on a foundation of western ethics, computer ethics is a complex and evolving discipline that applies traditional ethics theory in an attempt to make fair and just decisions about how technology systems are used. As defined by Moor and Spinello (2004), computer ethics “identifies and analyzes the impacts of information technology on social and human values like health, wealth, work, opportunity, freedom, democracy, knowledge, privacy, security, self-fulfillment, etc.” (cited in Spinello & Tavani, 2004, p. 20). These theories may be inapplicable for other cultures with worldviews that differ from the western worldview. Thus, they may be inadequate for solving the ethical issues involving culturally based disagreements that are likely to arise in distance education programs (Spinello, 2006). The existing theories help determine an answer to the question, What should we do? However, they overlook a deep analysis that answers the more fundamental question, Why should we do it? 
On the other hand, many contend the current ethics theories have worked for resolving ethical issues over the use of technology in the past, and there is no reason to expect they cannot work now (Spinello, 2004, 2006; Gert, 1999). For one thing, computer technology has not brought any new moral issues, according to some proponents (Spinello, 2004). Thus, it is acceptable to look to traditional theories such as utilitarianism and deontology, according to this position. 
Spinello (2005) outlines the basic theories that govern technology decisions today. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory with global applicability because it allows one to choose the alternative that has the “greatest net benefit (or the lowest net costs) for the widest community affected by that alternative” (p. 11). Contractarianism, a deontologic theory, is a “rights-based approach to ethics [that] focuses on the need to respect an individual’s rights as the basis of justice and fairness” (p. 14). Moral Duty, a philosophy based on earlier work by Kant, is a duty-based ethical theory that assumes a universal moral law (p. 14). The New Natural Law theory of ethics maintains an “unwavering fidelity to the role of basic human goods such as life, health, and knowledge of truth” (p. 20). While all of these theories provide a useful basis from which to examine ethical dilemmas arising from the use of technology, none of them will work for every situation. Furthermore, there is disagreement between theories as to whether a universal moral philosophy based on common values is possible.
Common Values
Most societies seem to share common values such as life, happiness, and freedom from harm. Theoretically, basic human values, or “metanorms” across societies are similar and these values guide decisions to choose ethical behavior (Spinello, 2006, p. 4). Spinello (2006), in speaking of these ethics principles, contends, “the fundamental principles…are metanorms; they have universal value” (p. 4). Moor (1998) asserts there are “core values” (p. 50). Further, there are “core goods” which include “life, happiness, and autonomy” and “core evils” such as “death, unhappiness, and lack of autonomy” (Moor, 1999, p. 109). These moral systems are assumed common across cultures, allowing for ethical decisions across cultural barriers, thus, theoretically, it is possible to make decisions that do not cause harm (Moor, 1999). Gert (1999) concurs, describing “common morality” from which “justified moral rules” develop, such as the “do not kill” imperative (p. 101).
Assuming that metanorms can achieve satisfactory ethical decisions consistently across cultures is a non sequitur logical fallacy. This test fails upon examination of how the value for human life plays out in the U.S. alone, let alone across cultures. For example, in the U.S. the value of life and the imperative not to kill would be considered a “do not harm” metanorm based on this philosophy. An exception would be the case of self-defense. Yet, it is acceptable to kill in any number of circumstances, if one takes the position that killing is an unjustified, premeditated act to end another person’s life (e.g. the death penalty, assisted suicide). This metanorm also fails in other cultures that place value on killing in particular circumstances and view certain types of killing as virtuous, even though the culture may readily proclaim to value human life. It becomes clear that metanorms are meaningless for informing certain types of ethical decisions, such as when it is acceptable to violate the “do not harm” metanorm.
Moor (1998) points out, “Possessing core human values is a sign of being rational but is not a sufficient condition for being ethical” (p. 51). He further argues, disagreements may have as much to do with “factual matters as with value differences” (Moor, 1998, p. 53). While this may be true within culture, it is difficult to extend this explanation to multiple cultures in which values are acted upon differently. In the U.S., the Terri Shaivo case, which was a dispute that centered on the removal of a feeding tube from a woman who was presumably in a permanent vegetative state, was based primarily on facts pertaining to whether or not she was in a permanent vegetative state. It was determined that she was not alive in any meaningful sense; therefore killing her was not actually an act of killing. However, facts alone cannot be attributed to why another culture chooses to kill a woman for infidelity if viewed only from the western perspective. Infidelity in western culture does not equate to being dead; although in the culture that chooses this action, it could very well mean spiritual death and be viewed the same way vegetative state is viewed. Obviously, there is a sharp value difference in this example arising from cultural differences and different interpretation of facts; thus, a discussion of “factual matters” (Moor, 1998, p. 53) is irrelevant and futile toward reaching a mutual agreement about right and wrong in these two cases.
To place a higher value on a western-based ethical system, which allows killing, than another cultural system, which also allows killing, is ethnocentric and illogical. Moor (1998) also points out, “to adopt an ethical point of view one must respect others and their core values” (p. 51). Forcing a perceived superior viewpoint on others is unethical, and it is likely to create intense conflict and dissention. It is easy to see how establishing a uniform set of ethical principles becomes nearly impossible. Policies derived would be contentious. While cultures may agree in a broad sense that it is not acceptable to harm others, obviously, in practice, this becomes something in which the metanorm, “do not harm” may just as well not exist since western-based ethics theory fails to go beyond the facts. There is something more beneath the surface, at the spiritual or philosophical level. If it is not revealed, understood, and integrated into a solution, there can only be a resolution that causes harm.
Moor (1998) explains that the greatest threat to computer ethics is not disagreement, but “a failure to debate the ethical issue of technology at all…. [it is] then when we are in the greatest danger of being harmed by computer technology” (p. 53). This point is one that should not be taken lightly in relation to metanorms. If the theory of metanorms is accepted and this leads to the failure to adequately debate issues, we are risking the danger of just that – of causing harm. Thus, the assumption that there are metanorms across cultures may impede a full and deep inquiry into the consequences of ethical decisions. This ends up the justification of leaving out of interested parties, namely some of the very individuals the decisions might directly harm. Consequently, there is an urgent need for analysis that does not assume common morality as a given, and a discussion that is not locked into a circular reasoning over facts, if ethics theory is to be applied globally. Unfortunately, none of the current theories provides a complete framework for all issues that are likely to be confronted in a global community (Spinello, 2005). What is needed is a new theory.
Since none of these theories work in isolation or for every ethical dilemma, Spinello (2006) proposes using a patchwork approach for making ethical decisions. As he contends, “none of these theories are without flaws or contradictions, but they do represent viable avenues for reasoning about moral issues…” (p. 20). He has developed a set of “operative questions” for each of the major theories: consequentialism/utilitarianism, duty-based morality, rights-based morality, and new natural law, but he also admits that “one must decide which framework should ‘trump’ or override the others” (Spinello, 2006, p. 21). In other words, the ethical choice is ultimately the choice of the parties making it, which, out of tradition, are unrepresentative individuals sitting at a boardroom table. Tradition results in a few individuals making decisions that affect many, based on the European ethnocentric worldview.
Worldviews and Ethnocentrism
Worldviews involve looking at existence through a lens that provides meaning to that existence; it relates to philosophy, spirituality, and religion, and it differs between cultures. Most worldviews are anthropocentric to some degree. Some worldviews are ethnocentric, which creates blinders to other views. While some worldviews incorporate the ability to envision, accept, and incorporate other worldviews, the western worldview has the tendency to take on the perspective that it is the one true, correct, and superior worldview, which some societies interpret as western arrogance. 
The perception by other societies that U.S. citizens are arrogant is not new. Interestingly, the attitude evolved from European historical roots. The U.S., referred to globally as “America,” is a name handed down from Europe during the colonial period and came to be associated with arrogance, at least by some societies.
Arrogant american remains slang for "people from the United States who think they and their ways are superior" to others…. Calling someone from the Americas, the two continents sliced only by a thin canal at Panama, "american" is technically correct. But the term is sanctioned to refer only to those from the United States, perhaps that itself is simply arrogant….Peculiarly or not, the term "american," did not begin in the United States, it was used by the British, or to be exact, citizens of England in the early 1800s. At that time, England was thought of as arrogant by other nations and cultures. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, Great Britain was afterall the world's super power, even having lost to the "americans." Arrogantly so, the British saw only one other true player on the map -- America-- the French were simply ignored. (Miller, 2008). 

An examination of pioneers’ worldviews during the settlement of the New World as contrasted to Native American worldviews illustrates the types of actions that can arise from this inherited ethnocentric worldview. The settlers came to view the New World as a somewhat free-for-all opportunity to be used for their personal gain. They viewed Native Americans as intrinsic to the wilderness, thus they were to be conquered or assimilated within western culture. The cultural clash, as is well known, resulted in highly unethical actions taken by settlers that were justified through their ethnocentric blinders. For example, in one of the more egregious acts, Native American children were torn away from their families and forced to attend boarding schools in order to assimilate them into what was believed to be a better, western way of life. 
Mary Crow Dog, author of “Lakota Woman,” tells of BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] agents barging into the homes of the Sioux Indians and dragging children away from their families in order to assimilate them into "white society." She described the taking of those children to the boarding schools as "kidnapping." At the boarding schools, the children were forced to cut their hair, kept away from their families, sometimes were told their families were dead or didn’t want them anymore and often abused both mentally and physically. In her book, she describes the schools as, "sterile, cold atmosphere, an unfamiliar routine, language problems, and above all the maza-skan-skan, that damn clock-- white man's time as opposed to Indian time, which is natural time." (p. 29). (Hyde, 1997, para. 1).

This action continued well into the 1900’s. In fact, the Theodore Roosevelt School, a boarding school in northeastern Arizona is still in operation today (Hyde, 1997, para. 4). The action of forcing children to attend these boarding schools caused immense harm and influences Native American views toward education today. 
There are many examples in which actions indicate the western worldview fails to acknowledge other views throughout the world today (e.g. forcing the U.S. form of representative democracy, as if it is a superior form of democracy, on other countries). The perception from other societies is no doubt that the U.S. needs to get its own house in order before giving out advice or expecting others to live according to U.S. ethical standards. This housecleaning needs to be completed before venturing out and attempting to force other societies to align with a misaligned worldview that too often fails to respect other cultures or incorporate their alternative viewpoints.
Cultural differences may seem small, but they run deep. They are real and they are basic, according to Tuthail, Dally, and Routledge (2006). People from other societies view their relationships, responsibilities, and rights very differently than U.S. citizens. Further, “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones” (Tuthail, Dally, & Routlege, 2006, p. 158). Many intense wars have waged over cultural and worldview differences.
Although environmental ethicists have acknowledged the need to incorporate alternative worldviews and distance themselves from the anthropocentrism embedded in western-based ethics, they still use traditional ethical theories and methods (Brennan, 2008). Others theorists believe there is no need for a new “non-anthropocentric” theory; but rather, there needs to be an “enlightened” anthropocentrism (Brennan, 2008). “This allows a more pragmatic approach for asserting a moral responsibility toward environmental sustainability, and it provides a sufficient basis for establishing policy” (Brennan, 2008). Others argue that adoption of a non-anthropocentric worldview is not possible because decisions will always be influenced by our human needs (Brennan, 2008). For example, actions selected for environmental protection will tend to reflect the view that the environment is something humans benefit from. Besides, it is difficult to conceive of the environment valuing human life as something it can experience benefit from in the same manner, yet ridding ourselves completely of anthropocentrism may require this exercise. 
Perhaps there is no escaping from anthropocentric thought; however, there are greater benefits overall from making the effort. While this represents a somewhat utilitarian perspective, it simply serves as a reminder that a new theory of ethics is a transformative process that necessarily requires an evolution that may include falling back on western-based ethics theory from time-to-time along the path. As well, traditional ethics have value for certain ethical decisions. As a minimum, ethnocentric tendencies must be directly confronted before embarking too deeply into the global education environment, and efforts must be made to involve more people in making decisions about how technology is used. Thus, the exercise in eliminating anthropocentrism is a necessary first step in this process.
Unfortunately, western society, in its movement toward more holistic considerations, has not been successful in shaking ethnocentric views. Environmental ethics, which is defined as is “the discipline that studies the moral relationship of human beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its nonhuman contents,” (Brennan, 2008) moves toward incorporating other worldviews, but the ethnocentric challenge needs to be overcome if the theory is to be useful for a global community.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1976), and its mandate to develop Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) when actions may result in environmental damage, provides an example of an attempt to incorporate other worldviews to resolve conflicts over how the environment is used. It has been successful in establishing community, and sometimes global, consensus in meeting goals related to the preservation of the environment, when the process is used strategically. However, it also provides an example of a policy that often stops short of taking inclusive action.
According to Eccleston (2000), “all too often, preparation of an EIS is viewed as a document preparation process as opposed to a comprehensive planning process” (p. 5). Eccleston (2000), continues, “Most project personnel view an EIS as simply covering the ‘bugs and bunnies issues,’ yet it is far more comprehensive than that (e.g., it addresses socioeconomic, cultural, and other issues)” (p. 37). Thus, loopholes promote traditional decision-making practices, and participants from the communities affected by the decisions are deceived into believing their voices count when they do not. Why should we do it? is answered in this case, but it is not always acknowledged in a meaningful sense nor applied to the actions. There is more to making sound ethical decisions than merely discovering why something should be done and then not doing it. The reasons, as determined by all stakeholders, must be incorporated into the solution, not merely considered after the fact.
This provides another example of a sense of superiority or arrogance, or an example of how “epistemologies of mastery…have dominated philosophical and non-philosophical discourses alike, closing off other knowledge possibilities through their pretensions of providing a single true story and shaping our lives in the process” (Grasswick, 2008, p. 152.).  It illustrates how ethnocentric tendencies impede ethical actions when trying to base decisions using current ethics theories and procedures. 
Granted, the theories are useful for exploring alternatives for making decisions about complex moral issues. As pointed out previously, western ethics provides tools, albeit in a patchwork fashion, for exploring solutions. However, the problem, due to the continuing ethnocentric nature of the western worldview by which these theories have been applied, is not only that the intrinsic value of nonliving things is ignored but, often other views as well. Thus, the Why should we do it? question is often not adequately addressed. That the best ethical decisions can result from discourse based on a western-biased, white male-dominated, patchwork quilt ethical framework that assumes common values across cultures has not been adequately examined and it is extremely presumptuous to assume decisions will represent all other, glaringly absent stakeholders. 
The acceptance that a few good (usually, white) men can sit around a big conference table and figure out the why behind the goodness in decisions they make may be the most damaging assumption in the application of ethics theory today. Yet, this is standard practice on ethics boards, thus affecting decisions for law, medicine, technology, finance, and science. That the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted this methodology epitomizes how ingrained this practice is. Following traditional practices for forming ethics committees and making decisions that will ultimately affect the entire world, the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee is composed of 80% men who, “intend to develop ‘universal’ norms in bioethics” (Dickerson, 2006). Critics objected to the lack of representation of women stating, “The notion that a universal set of bioethical norms endorsed by the nations of the world will be the product of a male-dominated process is absurd” (Hinsch, 2005, cited in Dickerson, 2006, p. 115). 
The notion that only one individual can represent an entire country and only 36 countries can represent the entire world to develop a universal set of bioethical norms is just as absurd, especially given that thirty-three percent of the countries on the committee represent Europe. Only a single country represents the entire African continent, which is comprised of 53 countries. Looking at it another way, there are only 728 million people in Europe compared to the total world population of 6.7 billion. There are 900 million people in Africa, and both China and India have populations of more than a billion people. The committee heavily weights toward the European ethnocentric worldview in spite of being the minority of the world population.
Deep Ecology
Needed in place of this ethnocentric worldview is ecological thinking, “a revisioned mode of engagement with knowledge, subjectivity, politics, ethics, science, citizenship, and agency that pervades and reconfigures theory and practice” (Code, cited in Grasswick, 2008, p. 151). Code brings the discussion of ethics closer to an ecological approach by replacing the term “communities” with “habitats” (Grasswick, 2008). The effect is the moving away from anthropocentric and western ethnocentric culture, yet at the same time acknowledging the need to connect the social world with the physical world when making complex ethics decisions (Grasswick, 2008). This approach ensures the exploration of Why should we do this? at all levels. 
Deep ecology, which evolved from the desire to address the ecological crisis exposed in the 1960s with Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, moves ethical philosophy closer to a holistic theory (Harding, 1998). Arne Naess, a young philosopher, derived the theory from a close examination of the concept of ecological science (Harding 1998, para. 1). However, science was concerned with mere facts and Naess wanted to go beyond the facts, because in his view facts alone cannot provide answers to ethical questions (Harding, 1998). Facts are too superficial to solve ethical dilemmas such as how two different cultures justify killing for different reasons. According to Kreyche (2007), ethics based on current theory simply promise more than they have been able to deliver. 
Naess felt that we need an “ecological wisdom,” (Harding, 1998, para. 3). “Deep ecology seeks to develop this by focusing on deep experience, deep questioning, and deep commitment. These constitute an interconnected system” (Harding, 1998, para. 3). Therefore, the practice of determining ethical choices becomes an interconnected, continuous process of deep engagement, deep questioning, and a deep commitment to taking action.
Lest this sound similar to western-based ethics discussions, the Deep Ecology framework is unique in a number of ways. It rids itself of the anthropocentric view, and thus the ethnocentric tendencies, because through deep engagement there becomes a “fundamental equality between human and non-human life in principle” (Harding, 1998, para. 9). This experience then leads into deep questioning whereby “one looks at the collective psychological origins of the ecological crisis and the related crisis of peace and social justice” (Harding, 1998, para. 11). This implies that all actions are analyzed for their potential impact on values relating to justice, fairness, and ecological sustainability. Through Deep Ecology philosophy, ecological sustainability is supported because of its inherent value rather than the extrinsic value it provides humans, and this value is ascertained through questioning.
Deep questioning occurs in four stages with level four constituting a “practical realm” and level one, the “religious or philosophical realm” (Harding, 1998, para. 13). The objective is to reach the level one realm by asking a series of Why? questions so that one is able to “make a statement which encapsulates our deepest intuitions” and bring to light the “ultimate norms” that reside in the spiritual or philosophical realm” (Harding, 1998, para. 13).
Ultimate norms can be compared to Spinello’s (2006) contention that there are metanorms. However, for the deep ecologist, these norms are divorced from anthropocentric and ethnocentric worldviews and they are not considered absolute. “This deep questioning of the fundamental assumptions of our culture contrasts markedly with the mainstream shallow or reform approach.” (Harding, 1998, para 12). Therefore, as Glasser points out, an ultimate norm, which is not an absolute norm, to “live richly” may be experienced or explained as “living a simple life.” (cited in Harding, 1998, para.14). This would result in more questioning (What is a simple life?) and ultimately, culminate in actions that lead to beneficial ecological outcomes. (Glasser, cited in Harding, 1998, para.14)
The Deep Ecology platform is made up of the following eight points: “(1)All life has value in itself, independent of its usefulness to humans; (2) Richness and diversity contribute to life's well-being and have value in themselves; (3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs in a responsible way; (4) The impact of humans in the world is excessive and rapidly getting worse; (5) Human lifestyles and population are key elements of this impact (6) The diversity of life, including cultures, can flourish only with reduced human impact; (7) Basic ideological, political, economic and technological structures must therefore change; and (8)Those who accept the foregoing points have an obligation to participate in implementing the necessary changes and to do so peacefully and democratically.” (Harding, 1998, para. 22).
As shown, the key to Deep Ecology is to reach point eight and make a commitment to taking action. When an ecological worldview is fully integrated as one’s philosophical framework, this happens as a natural process. The combination of deep experience and deep questioning culminates in deep commitment, which manifests itself in the form of taking action to create change (Harding, 1998). This change can manifest in any number of ways that support ecological sustainability, create social justice, and promote peace.
Deep Ecology provides a solid framework for the development of a complete theory of ethics. By attaining level one through deep questioning, the ultimate answers to the question Why? that western-based ethical theory often overlooks can be revealed. In addition, the process eliminates the conflicts that might arise from ethnocentric and anthropocentric worldviews. Thus, it promotes sustainability of both relationships and the environment.	
Toward a New Theory of Ethics
The presumption that western-based ethics theories will be able to support sustainability is ethnocentric, an act of denial, and offensive to other cultures and societies. If U.S. educational institutions offer distance programs globally and attempt to force western-based ethics onto other cultures, there will likely be negative unintended consequences (Huff, 2004). These factors need to be considered prior to implementing distance education programs on a global basis. There is a need to go back to the drawing board and redesign ethics theory to eliminate ethnocentric thinking in order to successfully venture out into the global distance education market. A promising solution is to take the deep ecology philosophy further and to promote the emergence of a new theory of ethics based on a foundation of its platform. This provides a chance for creating consensus for how distance education programs use technology to present knowledge to other societies in the world.
While it is the responsibility of U.S. instructional designers and distance education program administrators to abide by U.S. laws in the creation and implementation of their programs, it is not realistic to expect global consensus to laws created in the U.S. that have been based on western values and ethics. Nor is it realistic to expect others to follow U.S. laws when they live in another country. For example, it has long been customary to recognize intellectual property rights in the U.S., but in many societies, people do not conceive of these rights in the same manner. 
Distance education programs offered from the US either need to be explicitly transparent in expectations of students who choose to participate in them, or they need to adopt a more open and flexible approach that welcomes and embraces cultural differences. The latter approach requires a careful balancing act between meeting the needs of U.S. students and students from other countries, and it is doubtful that ethics based on western ideals is up to the job. The ethics theories as applied today to technology are ethnocentric, gender biased, and based on logical fallacies, and they are not solving controversies in the U.S. over the use of Internet and related technologies. Thus, it would be irrational to force them upon other cultures and to rely on them to solve ethical issues in global distance education programs. While it might be safer to cater to only those learners who adapt to U.S. ethics, laws, and policies, a better approach is to incorporate the Deep Ecology philosophical framework and work toward the development of a new theory of ethics that eliminates western ethnocentricity from the equation. This move will place distance education programs in a much better position for making a sincere contribution to the United Nations’ (1997) goal of achieving the universal right to education. 
In order to move toward a new theory of ethics based on the deep ecology platform, each distance education program must be evaluated according to the institution’s mission, the learners being served, the technologies being used, and its educational goals. Next, a strategy should be developed for incorporating the philosophy’s eight points. Implementation of the new program requires a process that is applied gradually to integrate the philosophy within the educational system in a way that meets the institutional goals and learner needs. Learners can be educated about the deep ecology platform by incorporating instruction of the philosophy within coursework. Additionally, the philosophy should be integrated into the decision-making process for establishing program policy. 
Environmental ethics provide procedures for successful processes to enlist stakeholder participation as well as successful examples, and instead of stopping short of incorporating stakeholder voices, the collectively created information gathered should be incorporated into explicit action plans. Program administrators can leverage technology for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating stakeholder perspectives. For example, asynchronous discussion, blogs, email, and synchronous methods maximize stakeholder involvement with the process. Data capturing, data mining, and analysis techniques can accurately interpret and analyze stakeholders’ perspectives, with their knowledge and consent, and compiled to inform decisions based on consensus.
Institutional committees that represent the cultural diversity within the program can handle daily decisions. To avoid or minimize conflicts and risks, distance education institutions should make it high priority to develop these institutional ethics committees with appropriately balanced representation according to culture, race, age, sex, socioeconomic status, etc. The purpose of these committees, which might be compared to Institutional Review Boards, is to remain instantly available to make decisions involving complex and sensitive ethical issues. They would do so through a mandate to incorporate the voices of all stakeholders. Unlike laws guiding the establishment of review boards, policy should not allow qualifications to trump representation. More important than predetermined qualifications in reaching fully developed ethical considerations, are the voices of the multicultural, multidisciplinary, and gender balanced participating stakeholders who can present a global view. 
It should be clear that the application of western-based ethics theories would not be successful as a foundation for global distance education. Distance educators, who directly make use of increasingly available technology to teach globally, have the moral responsibility, or more precisely, the duty to uncover and ultimately change the tradition of making decisions in the boardroom using western-based ethics and inadequate representation. Instead, administrators must nourish a new theory of ethics so that it can evolve to sustain both environment and relationships through the full participation of all stakeholders. Technology provides the tools to help make this possible; deep ecology provides the philosophical foundation.
 Program administrators should approach the incorporation of the deep ecology platform as a continuous, cyclical process that spirals to greater levels of understanding and enlightenment. Above all, much like action research, the question, Why should we do this? needs to be asked, listened to, acted upon, and evaluated repeatedly within the dynamic, changing educational environment. Only then, can a more holistic theory of ethics evolve to sustain a diverse, thriving, global community.

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